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This paper examines the way public assets should be managed to preserve the 
national wealth. The research idea arises from experiences of some developed 
countries that manage their public assets through public investment funds, i.e. 
sovereign wealth funds. Drawing on the knowledge that public authorities in 
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investors do and that public assets are “manageable”, the paper deals with 
public property preservation and usage, and value enhancement in transition 
countries. We analyse the preconditions for efficient public asset management 
and ask whether the employment of public assets under the supervision of 
professional management can ensure better public services and welfare to the 
citizens of transition countries, once privatisation processes of public assets are 
close to being finalised. 
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1  Introduction
1
 
 
In the last two decades of the 20th century, many countries started investing in 
the modernisation of the public sector. The entire public sector modernisation 
process is often summarised under the broader term of the “New Public 
Management” (NPM), which refers to the overall set of financial and 
administrative reforms in the public sector. The changes in public asset 
management and governance policies are considered the greatest challenges in 
the history of the NPM implementation to date. 
 
We understand public sector asset management reforms as a major factor and 
one that is increasingly changing public sector organisations. There are plenty 
of studies on experiences with public asset management reform (PAMR) in 
various countries (Likierman, 1994; Barret, 2004; Lyons, 2004). The studies on 
PAMR, in particular, take into account the implementation of market 
efficiency and good governance principles as well as business-style accounting 
and financial reporting practices in general government. 
 
In parallel with the NPM reforms, a trend of tremendous public assets growth 
has accelerated worldwide. The surge in public assets was most evident in 
central banks’ reserves, especially in Asia, followed by an increase in public 
assets in the existing and newly formed state-owned funds. Since the 1950s, 
different types of entities established by the state or government have emerged 
as managers of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). 
 
The discussion on the SWFs’ presence in the global financial market and their 
impact on local economies was vividly addressed in the business and scientific 
literature during 2007 (Aslund, 2007; Brooks, 2007; Gjessing and Syse, 2007). 
The investment policy of the SWFs is similar to that of other institutional 
investors - pension funds, investment funds, and hedge and private-equity 
funds. However, the fact that the SWFs are state-owned raises many questions 
                                                 
1 This paper is a result of research project “Restrukturiranje i konkurentnost hrvatskih poduzeća u 
pridruživanju EU”/“Restructuring and competitiveness of Croatian companies during the accession to the 
EU” (project no. 002-0022469-2466) funded by the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, Croatia. The 
first draft of this paper was presented at the 31st Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association in 
April 2008 held in Rotterdam, The Netherlands. 
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regarding their role in international relations. This refers in particular to the 
corporate governance and accountability policies SWF managers adopt to the 
owners of the monies managed in the funds during the course of the 
investment process. 
 
Like other NPM reform mainstreams, corporate governance was firstly 
developed and implemented in the private sector and then translated into the 
public sector. The foundations of corporate governance are separation of 
ownership and management (control) and separation of the roles of chief 
executives and chairmen. Corporate governance has been considered a serious 
issue in the public sector due to concerns over confidentiality in decision 
making, openness and accountability within the government, and 
accountability of the government to the citizens. Governance in the public 
sector implies all principles of corporate governance such as a clear definition 
of desired outcomes, well-defined functions and responsibilities of public 
management, an appropriate corporate culture, transparent decision-making 
and accountability to the citizens. 
 
Good governance in the public sector financial management cannot be 
separated from good governance in the state in general. We understand good 
governance as a result of the legitimacy earned by those who enjoy the public 
trust to exercise institutional power over public resources, taking care of the 
public interests and common welfare. Likewise, the postulates of the civil 
society can be regarded as vital in implementing sound and efficient public 
sector financial management.  
 
The aim of this paper is to examine why property ownership rights in the 
public sector are quite often equated with the rights to manage public property 
(Nivet, 2004; Ostrom, 2003). This phenomenon particularly concerns those 
transition countries of Southern and Eastern Europe (SEE) and Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) wherein the transformation from planned to market 
economy has failed to enhance the welfare of the citizens. The equation of 
ownership rights with control rights can happen whenever a natural monopoly 
is concerned. But, in circumstances in which no chain of accountability has 
been distinguished, there is often a crucial misconception concerning what 
ownership and management mean in general.  
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In this paper, we argue that it is incorrect to regard ownership and 
management rights as equal. We discuss the difference between the two, and 
establish some guidelines concerning possible public property usage and good 
governance mechanisms linking the managers and owners of the public assets. 
Throughout the paper we rely on the presumption that all property that 
belongs to the state actually belongs to its citizens. Appointees in the top 
state/governmental institutions are only agents or intermediaries, chosen, by 
the democratic will of the citizens as expressed in the parliamentary elections, 
to fulfil public duties. In other words, the state institutions should be held 
accountable to act in the best interest of the citizens with respect to the 
preservation, employment and value enhancement of the national property. 
Therefore, the existence of a responsible and accountable government, oriented 
towards achieving welfare for all its citizens, is a precondition for an efficient 
PAMR. Once the accountability chain has been clearly defined, PAMR can 
start. Although there are various options for the use of public assets, in this 
paper we shall examine more closely the management practices for public 
assets pooled into public investment funds. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section discusses the 
differences between private and public property rights and the types of public 
assets over which these rights are exercised. It also deals with the classifications 
of public assets and liabilities. The main postulates of modern public asset 
management and good governance within the broader concept of the NPM are 
presented in the third section of the paper. The fourth section is devoted to 
the way in which state-owned and government investment companies and 
funds are created, and to the types of public assets that are managed that way. 
The accountability of investment companies to the public is also considered. 
The fifth section evaluates if and to what extent public asset management can 
be organised for the accomplishment of public goals in transition countries. 
Bearing in mind the current economic, political and government organisation 
settings in transition countries in general, this section of the paper offers some 
recommendations for better public asset management. The last section 
concludes. 
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2  Defining Features of Property Rights, Public 
Assets and Liabilities 
 
Governments in transition countries do not often possess even the basic 
knowledge of the types of assets that comprise the public asset portfolio, of 
who is the actual and who is the institutional owner of public assets, and who 
has the right (privilege) to control public assets. Therefore, although property 
rights features are more or less widely recognised, we deem their brief 
summary necessary for a better understanding of property rights perception 
and enforcement in transition countries. 
 
The basic definition of property rights is that they are institutional rights that 
determine the allocation of assets among the public, public institutions, 
public/private entities and individuals. The precondition for realising property 
rights is their wide recognition and enforcement, ensured by legislation and 
judicial systems. Once properly registered, property rights to both private and 
public property can be enforced. Libecap (1989) defines property rights as the 
rights to use, to earn income from and to transfer or exchange the assets and 
resources. Similarly, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) describe the following 
composite characteristics of the property rights: 
• access is the right to enter a certain property; 
• withdrawal is the right to enjoy the material and immaterial 
“products” of the property; 
• management is the possibility to regulate internal use patterns and 
transform the resource by making improvements; 
• exclusion is the right to determine who shall have an access right and 
how that right may be transferred; while 
• alienation is the right to sell or lease either or both the management 
and exclusion right. 
 
According to Schlager and Ostrom (1992), the term property rights refers to 
operational rights such as access and withdrawal right, and to management 
rights including management, exclusion and alienation of certain property. It 
may be that the best definition of property rights is given by the property 
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rights theory which suggests that two economic elements are critical to 
understanding ownership: residual control rights and residual rights to 
income. We adopt such an economic approach to property rights when 
discussing property rights to public assets, treating property rights and 
ownership rights as synonyms. 
 
The first step in defining public property rights is to determine what public 
property is. In other words, we need to determine the objects over which 
property rights can be exercised. 
 
Public property is sometimes referred as “commons”, although the term 
“commons” also implies physical resources that are neither owned privately 
nor by the state, including those that are not closely regulated by the state 
(Berge, 2007). Similarly, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) define “common-
property” resources (“common-pool” resources) as property owned by a 
government, property owned and protected by a community of resource users,2 
and property owned by no one. Their first two defining features of “common 
property” imply that there is no difference between common and public 
property. However, the first term refers to state or central government 
ownership, while the latter is related to the ownership rights of 
municipalities/local administrative bodies/local government. The third 
defining feature of “common property”, i.e. that the property is owned by no 
one, is nowadays frequently used in academic polemics on so-called open-
access resources, such as oceans, sea, lakes, air and inaccessible forests. These 
debates, often provoked by uncontrolled pollution, mainly focus on resources 
that are not covered by tight regulation and that are accessible to anyone.3  
 
A further gradation of common property is given by McKean (1992: 251-252) 
who classifies the property according to the type of its owner into the 
following groups: 
                                                 
2 The term used in the UK for this type of common property is the “commons”. 
3 The last feature of the “commons”, according to which they belong to everybody and no one at the same time, 
is meritorious for the creation of the term “global ownership” on certain resources. 
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• unowned non-property (or open-access resources) to which no one 
has rights and from which no potential user can be excluded; 
• public property held in trust by the state, to which the general public 
often has access, e.g. national parks, municipal parks, city streets, 
highways, waterways; 
• state property that is essentially the exclusive property of government 
bodies, such as government offices, office furniture and equipment of 
public administration; 
• jointly owned private property whose individual co-owners may sell 
their shares at their own will without consulting other co-owners; 
• common or communal property or jointly owned private property 
without unilaterally tradable shares; 
• individually-owned private property whose owners generally have full 
and complete ownership rights except when these are attenuated by 
government regulation. 
 
Ownership rights entrusted to certain institutions cannot by any means be 
assumed as essentially the same as private ownership rights, as is often the case 
in transition countries. Ownership rights entrusted to public institutions can 
be reckoned as the rights adopted by regulation that oblige public institutions 
to act as stewards of public assets. The public institutions represent a broad 
owners’ base of people living in a certain central or local state area. If public 
institutions were not committed to the stewardship of public assets, it would 
be very difficult to regulate the real ownership rights that change constantly 
and in line with the changes in demographic picture. 
 
The question that evolves here is whether public property is the same as public 
good. The answer is no, since public property includes public good. Therefore, 
public good is always treated as public property but public property is much 
broader in scope than public good. 
 
The economic theory defines public good as public property with two 
prevailing characteristics: non-excludability of access to public good (though it 
does not mean that multiple users’ access to public good is granted for free), 
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and non-rivalry in consumption (Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud, 2006). We 
would make an add-on to both of these features stating that public good only 
relies to the access to and non-rivalry in consumption of people living in the 
certain area that is the subject of the (state) regulation. A user should not be 
excluded from access to and benefits from the public good. Such exclusion 
would be possible in case of access to and benefits from the public property, 
although it might be difficult if users have become accustomed to public 
property usage. Although states have a sovereign right to declare public good 
and public property, the public good is more a matter of positive international 
practice than national legislations. The reason for this is that most public 
services are regarded as public goods. Even though public services can be 
provided by the private sector as well, their existence is impossible without 
strong regulation and support from the state. Thus, the state, by means of its 
institutional power, constantly creates preconditions for providing better 
public services, some of which are commonly treated as public goods.  
 
An illustration of the distinction between ownership rights and other rights 
that are often misinterpreted as ownership rights is shown in Table 1.   
 
Table 1  Bundles of Rights Associated with Positions 
Types of rights according to the regulated role of: 
Ownership rights’ 
features Full 
owner 
Proprietor 
Authorised 
claimant 
Authorised 
user 
Authorised 
entrant 
Access x X X X x 
Withdrawal x X X X  
Management x X X   
Exclusion x X    
Alienation x     
     
Source: Adopted and adapted from Ostrom (2003: 251). 
 
The first two defining features of ownership rights presented in Table 1 refer 
to access rights with usufruct, while the latter three focus on the enforcement 
of management rights. Pure ownership rights have to have all five defining 
features as shown in the case of “full owner”. Although all rights presented are 
guaranteed by regulation, the most prevailing provision in almost all 
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constitutions relies on the enforcement of private ownership rights. All other 
categories of ownership rights belonging to various state or governmental 
institutions have limitations. A proprietor may be understood as an equivalent 
to a concessionaire, while authorised claimant has rights of stewardship. An 
authorised user is the same as a lessee while an authorised entrant has access to 
resources only, mainly for the purpose of recreation. So, the regulated role of 
the property depends on its predetermined usage. 
 
There are two understandings of the concept of property – the broad view and 
the narrow view. Each relies on the management of property. According to the 
narrow view, property rights imply almost absolute right of asset disposal, and 
can be restricted only by (ex-ante) state regulation. The narrow view can, 
therefore, be equated with private property rights. The history of the narrow 
view of property rights, i.e. private property rights, dates back to 1236 when 
the English parliament enacted its first law on enclosure (Berge, 2007). Private 
property rights are usually connected with the ideology of liberalism, or laissez 
faire, which reached its peak in the 1980s when lots of public utilities were 
privatised for the sake of greater efficiency and the achievement of 
profitability. Secure, exclusive, transferable private property rights represent 
the main element of the incentive system of market economy. They are the 
necessary complement of financial discipline and competition, and they allow 
the development of efficient product, factor and financial markets (World 
Bank, 1996). 
 
Under the broad view, property rights ban the exclusion of anyone from 
enjoying the rights guaranteed by place of birth. Demsetz (1967: 354) defines 
communal ownership as “a right which can be exercised by all members of the 
community”. According to Shachar and Hirschl (2007: 264) “the right not to 
be excluded means that, as members of political community, individuals are 
seen as equal partners in the common enterprise of governing the 
commonweal”. The broad view encourages the concept of public ownership 
rights, treating the citizens not as stakeholders but as shareholders of common 
property. It also stresses the collective responsibility for public property usage. 
Unlike traditional forms of wealth, which are related to private property, 
valuables associated with the citizenry are derived specifically from holding a 
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status-entitlement that is dispensed by the state. For each community member, 
citizenry further entails a share of “ownership” and governance of that polity’s 
communal and pooled resources (Shachar and Hirschl, 2007: 261-262). 
 
As far as public property rights are concerned, many governments have 
adopted good governance and citizen-oriented public management as two 
prevailing principles. This is in fact a mixture of the broad and the narrow 
view on the enforcement of property rights, meaning that governments treat 
the citizens as stakeholders and partners in performing day-to-day public 
management (OECD, 2001). For state-owned enterprises (SOEs) governments 
are required to state their objectives as owner. According to an OECD study 
(2008), countries’ objectives range from “creating the value-added” (in France) 
to “attending to the common good” (in Norway). 
 
Taking the enumerated defining features of property rights into consideration, 
it becomes evident that although legally treated in the same way, property 
rights exercised by the public as the ultimate shareholder differ from property 
rights exercised by an individual or a private entity. After all, what makes them 
different is the usage value they provide to their beneficiaries/shareholders, as 
illustrated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Responsibilities under Various Property Rights 
Type of property 
Type of right 
Private property Commons Public Domain 
Right of access Exclusive Limited 
Open (conditional on 
good behaviour) 
Responsibility Individual (includes corporate) Community Social 
 
Source: Kneen (2004). 
 
The right of access can be perceived as a pure ownership right, while the 
responsibility right can be understood as management right. In that sense, as 
noticeable from Table 2, private property owners are in most cases the 
managers of their property, especially when real estate and small family 
businesses are in question. On the other hand, the owners of public property 
can be denied access to their property, but the responsibility for managing 
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public assets, whose institutional owners are certain general government 
bodies, always remains responsibility towards the community and/or the entire 
society, for the ultimate owners of public assets are the citizens. Stemming 
from this, a government is to protect private property rights and regulate 
public property rights (Yiu, Wong, and Yau, 2006: 90). The mechanisms that 
governments use for the protection and enforcement of property rights are 
legislation and governmental (public) institutions. 
 
When public sector reforms commenced in the 1980s, public property and the 
services resulted from its use started to be treated in the same way as the assets 
of any private entity. In other words, the property dimension was matched to 
the resource dimension (Pallot, 1990). The Public Sector Committee of the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) published its Study 2 entitled 
“Elements of Financial Statements by National Governments” in 1993. This 
Study adopts all defining features of assets as applied for business purposes, 
whereby public assets are controlled by their reporting entities. According to 
the Study, public assets are characterised by: 
• the existence of a service potential or future economic benefits; and 
• the service potential or future economic benefits that arise from past 
transactions/events. 
 
One of the subsequent IFAC studies - Study 5 (1995), entitled “Definition and 
Recognition of Assets”, distinguishes between the following types of public 
assets: 
• financial assets including cash, receivables, contractual rights to 
exchange financial instruments with another enterprise under 
potentially favourable conditions, and the equity instruments of 
another enterprise, i.e. shares in SOEs; and 
• physical assets consisting of inventories, long-term fixed assets, 
infrastructure, heritage assets, defence assets, natural resources, 
community assets, and intangible assets. 
 
Assets in general give rise to certain liabilities. Public assets are often 
recognised as pure budgetary expenditures. This is because the revenues of 
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assets are separated from the assets’ sources of finance. The separation of assets 
from the liabilities generated by the use of these assets prompts the accounting 
reform undertaking, i.e. introducing accruals. Accruals introduction is deemed 
necessary because under cash basis accounting that has prevailed in many 
countries for a long time no liabilities are recorded. Furthermore, in transition 
countries it often happens that public authorities are not aware of the actual 
size of the state-backed guarantees that have been issued, guarantees that are 
legally enforceable and sometimes huge. 
 
Public liabilities are defined and classified in IFAC Study 6 (1995), entitled 
“Accounting for and Reporting Liabilities”. The same study elaborates the 
effects of different accounting bases on the recognition and financial reporting 
of public liabilities. Public liabilities can be treated the same as the liabilities 
of any business entity, consisting of the accounts payable arising from the 
purchases of goods and services, accrued salaries and wages and other 
monetary and non-monetary compensations, employee pension obligations, 
accrued interest payable, amounts payable under guarantees, borrowings 
including short-term borrowings, long-term debt, loans and advances payable 
to other levels of government or government entities, lease obligations related 
to capital leases, but also currency issued and transfer payments payable. 
Owning to IFAC’s public liabilities’ classification, it is evident that the state 
must account for the entirety of its debts, both current and long-term. 
However, for the purpose of this research we disregard public debt and 
currency issuance-related liabilities. We rather focus on the liabilities that are 
directly connected to physical public assets. 
 
We take a broad view of property rights, treating citizens as the shareholders of 
national wealth, i.e. as the owners of public assets. Thus, the public property 
rights refer to the ownership rights that belong to the whole of the citizenry 
and/or the ownership rights that belong to local authorities/municipalities. 
Consequently, centralised state or government public asset management and 
decentralised municipal or local public management can be distinguished. 
Private entities/individuals that enjoy the benefits of property are responsible 
for the property they have exclusive access to. Unlike them, public officials in 
democratic countries have a limited right but unlimited responsibility for 
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public asset maintenance and for settling the liabilities arising from the 
existence or use of public assets. In other words, public officials have the 
privilege of managing public assets, of exercising a fiduciary duty to the 
citizens. 
 
Common ownership rights became increasingly bound to management rights 
throughout the 20th century, especially when the famous and often cited work 
“The Tragedy of the Commons” by Garret Hardin was published in 1968. The 
main premise of that work is that when a resource is owned by everyone, 
nobody has incentives to conserve it. The policy implication of the “tragedy of 
the commons” is to either privatise and/or regulate, or nationalise the 
resources, constantly keeping in mind that property rights are claims over 
future income from assets (Heltberg, 2001).4 Nowadays, we see that the 
existence of both public and private ownership options is possible, even at the 
same time.    
 
 
3  From Public Administration to New Public 
Management and Good Governance 
 
One of the crucial questions we aim to address is whether government officials 
can be as efficient as managers in private enterprises or whether they should 
delegate the managing role with respect to public assets to somebody else. 
 
The main premise of the modern property rights theory is that ownership 
rights are residual rights of control over assets. Demsetz (1967) pointed out 
that shareholders own only the shares of a corporation, not the particular 
parts of the corporation, and they, accordingly, are not owners but lenders of 
capital. Transferred to the state organisation, the citizens are lenders of capital 
who have a right of demanding the highest possible return on capital invested, 
i.e. money paid through taxes. Similarly, Duruigbo (2006: 67) states that 
“governments as trustees have a responsibility to discharge their obligations in 
                                                 
4 Hardin’s concerns on resource depletion should be observed in the context of strong population growth, which 
is an important problem in the countries with large population. 
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good faith. Governments are in a fiduciary relationship with the citizens that 
they cannot rightly or lightly be permitted to abuse”. 
 
Everyday government business activities are conducted by a public 
administration that is decentralised into administrative branches in charge of 
certain activities. There is a long-term development path from pure public 
administration to a publicly accountable management. As described by 
Sindane (2004: 668), “public administration is the organisation, mobilisation 
and management of human and material resources gathered to achieve the 
purpose and aims of the government”. In that sense, public administration 
should be perceived as a responsible government. The concept of accountable 
government prevailed before governments were flawed by corruption and 
scandals, before public officials started to be considered as bureaucrats acting 
by the book without taking the responsibility for their actions, and even 
worse, before the harmful effects of public officials’ work for the society 
started to be overlooked. This concept has been revived and popularised under 
the NPM approach. NPM became a synonym for ongoing processes of 
modernising governmental management and achieving efficiency in the public 
sector. Countries like Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand started the 
modernisation reform of their public sector in the 1980s (Pallot, 1996; 
Simpkins, 1998; Hepworth, 2002). Sets of improvements in public sector 
administrative and managerial functioning are described by numerous authors 
(Guthrie et al., 2005; Bolivar and Galera, 2007; Guthrie, Humphrey, and 
Olson, 2007). Azuma (2002) states that when applied in practice the NPM 
theory points out the following reform process determinants:  
• reposition of the general government and modification of its role 
within the economy – the general government is treated as a business 
entity that continuously and efficiently performs its activities (the 
“going concern” principle); 
• the implementation of good governance practice and business-style 
accounting and reporting in the general government sector; and 
• “performance-based management”. 
 
Similarly, Hood (1995; 2004) suggests that NPM postulates include: 
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• greater emphasis on citizen satisfaction since citizens are the clients 
for public sector services; 
• greater emphasis on management and accountability assessment 
methods; 
• the opening up of public sector entities to competition; 
• development of arrangements for the systematic comparison of 
activities between management units (benchmarking); and 
• the separation of policy-making from service delivery and the 
creation of agencies to deliver services. 
 
Governments tend to be linked with wider international public sector reform 
trends concerning the management of public expenditure and resource use 
that is to be carried out under the two basic concepts: governance and 
transparency. Hughes (1994) indicates that under NPM models the public 
administration that tends to be receptive must be based on the increase of the 
involvement of citizens as customers, on increased transparency and 
accessibility of public information to citizens. This refers to encouraging 
efficient control of public expenses and strengthening the level of 
accountability for managing public resources proactively. Thus, the three 
particularly important issues the NPM model emphasises are: citizen-centred 
services, value for taxpayers’ money and a responsible public service workforce 
(Bourgon, 2007). 
 
In the literature the term governance has multiple meanings. Most often it 
concerns the overall reform of public administration, as of the 1980s, and the 
analysis of corporate governance. Accordingly, various definitions of 
governance (Keefer, 2004: 4) tend to encompass one or both of the following: 
• the extent to which governments are responsive to citizens and 
provide them with certain core services, such as secure property rights 
and, more generally 
• the rule of law; and the extent to which the institutions and processes 
of government give government decision makers an incentive to be 
responsive to citizens. 
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In developing country literature governance most often refers to the process of 
decision-making and the process of implementing the policy decisions. Public 
institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the 
realisation of human rights and at the same time they are responsive to the 
present and future needs of the society.  
 
The striking idea of the NPM is that improved asset management results in 
better service delivery to and outcomes for the public (Lyons, 2004). According 
to Guthrie, Humphrey, and Olson (2007: 17), “in democracies, politicians are 
elected and they are supposed to represent the ideas and interests of the 
citizens. One of their roles is to allocate resources to appropriate activities or 
programs”. Therefore, the transparency principle is treated as a fundamental 
assumption for efficient public asset management. 
 
NPM postulates have often been criticised for their reliance on private sector 
management tools (McLaughlin, Osborne, and Ferlie, 2002; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004). In the private sector, the investor invests capital in a 
company with the aim to obtain financial return. The public sector is supplied 
with financial resources (taxes), which are not related to particular services. 
The primary difference between the public and the private sector is that 
governments have to provide public services to citizens by utilising budgetary 
income. The insufficient amount of budgetary revenues for financing the 
increasing public needs has led to greater readiness of the states to enter the 
projects with private sector entities, primarily in order to learn from them and 
make use of their valuable business experience. This refers to the ongoing 
process of modernising general government, which gradually becomes 
identical to a business entity that continuously and efficiently performs its 
activities, treating the citizens as customers. In order to supply the citizens 
with good quality of service in exchange for financial resources received, 
governments need to create an environment for improved, professional and 
responsible public asset management. This refers mostly to introducing 
governance and business-style reporting practices in governments whose 
quality of work becomes open to the citizens. Nowadays governance is used 
interchangeably both in the private and public sector, good governance being 
usually linked to the way business is conducted in the public sector while 
corporate governance is more common in the practice of the private sector. 
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According to the World Bank study (1994: Ch. vii), good governance is 
defined as the “manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development. Good governance is 
epitomised by predictable and enlightened policy-making (that is, transparent 
processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm 
of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society 
participating in public affairs and all behaving under the rule of law”. Good 
governance practice is also addressed in the literature as the “market model of 
governance” that has resulted “from government to governance” trend 
(Argyriades, 2006). “From government to governance” reflects the development 
of largely decentralised, cooperative ventures in which both public sector 
entities and private enterprises take part.  
 
Even though a uniform European Corporate Governance Code has not been 
developed yet, certain good governance principles have been incorporated in 
company acts and legislation of the member countries (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003). Some of the most obvious linkages between 
governance principles in the private and public sectors are given by OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) and OECD Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance of SOEs (2005). The two sets of principles are shown in Table 3. 
 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance have become an international 
benchmark for policy-makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders 
in both OECD and non-OECD countries. These Principles have also been 
immanent within the 'Lamfalussy Directives' that relate to public sector 
financial reform.5  
 
                                                 
5 Lamfalussy Directives encompass the Prospectus Directive that proclaims investor protection and market 
efficiency, the Market Abuse Directive that ensures integrity of community financial markets and enhances 
investor confidence in those markets, and the Transparency Directive that advocates information availability 
on issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market situated or operating within a 
Member State. 
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Nevertheless, due to the fact that in the case of SOEs the state holds the role 
of both representative owner and regulator, the SOEs are subject to even 
stricter governance standards. No matter whether used in the private or the 
public sector practice, (good) governance tends to have several major 
characteristics. Good governance is: 
• participatory – it encourages citizen (customer) participation in 
providing feedback on service quality; 
• consensus oriented – it tolerates and accepts diverse perspectives; 
• accountable – it takes responsibility for decisions that are in the 
interest of the public; 
• transparent – the decision-making processes are known to all; 
• sustainable – the gains it brings are able to survive political and 
administrative changes; 
• effective and efficient in the use of resources – it recognises the 3 Es: 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness; 
• equitable – it is concerned with equity and social justice; 
• legitimate and acceptable to the people – it follows the rules of law 
and the people recognise and accept the legitimacy of the institutions 
of governance; 
• enabling and facilitative – it is regulatory rather than controlling and 
it provides the context for innovation and creativeness.6  
 
The fact that public services differ from those provided by the private sector 
has resulted in the issuance of many different types of individual codes that 
apply to the specialised groups of public bodies. For example, the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) and the Office for 
Public Management in the UK established the Independent Commission that 
published Good Governance Standard for Public Services in 2004. The Standard sets 
out six core principles of good governance and their supporting principles for 
public service organisations, which are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
                                                 
6 United Nations Development Programme (1997). 
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Table 4 Core Principles of Good Governance for Public Service 
            Organisations 
Core principles of good 
governance 
Supporting principles 
1     Good governance means 
focusing on the organisation’s 
purpose and on outcomes for 
citizens and service users. 
• To be clear about the organisation’s purpose 
and its intended outcomes for citizens and 
service users. 
• To make sure the users receive a high quality 
service. 
• To make sure the taxpayers receive value for 
money. 
2     Good governance means 
performing effectively in clearly 
defined functions and roles. 
• To be clear about the functions of the 
governing body. 
• To be clear about the responsibilities of non-
executives and executives, and to make sure 
that those responsibilities are carried out. 
• To be clear about relationships between 
governors and the public. 
3     Good governance means 
promoting values for the whole 
organisation and 
demonstrating the values of 
good governance through 
behaviour. 
• To put organisational values into practice. 
• Individual governors should behave in ways 
that uphold effective Governance. 
4     Good governance means taking 
informed, transparent 
decisions and managing risk. 
• To be rigorous and transparent about how 
decisions are taken. 
• To have and use good quality information, 
advice and support. 
• To make sure that an effective risk 
management system is in operation. 
5     Good governance means 
developing the capacity and 
capability of the governing 
body to be effective. 
• To make sure that appointed and elected 
governors have the skills, knowledge and 
experience they need to perform well. 
• To develop the capability of people with 
governance responsibilities and evaluate their 
performance, both as individuals and as a 
group. 
•  To strike a balance, in the membership of the 
governing body, between continuity and 
renewal. 
6     Good governance means 
engaging stakeholders and 
making accountability real. 
• To understand formal and informal 
accountability relationships. 
• To take an active and planned approach to 
dialogue with, and to be accountable to, the 
public. 
• To take an active and planned responsibility 
approach to staff. 
• To engage effectively with institutional 
stakeholders. 
 
Source: Adopted and adapted from CIPFA (2005). 
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The Good Governance Standard for Public Services (CIPFA, 2004) is recommended 
for use by all levels of government, governing bodies involved in policy-
making, public-service partnerships and members of the public, for the sake of 
understanding the purpose of governance, assessing its effectiveness and  
demanding improvement if necessary. 
 
The resemblance of The Good Governance Standard for Public Services and The 
Principles of Corporate Governance, in that they both emphasise managing under 
the concepts of transparency, accountability, sustainability, efficiency and 
effectiveness, serves as a proof that in today’s economies interest in corporate 
governance goes beyond that of shareholders’ interest in the performance of 
individual companies. It even goes beyond the business sector. In the private 
sector the board represents a link between the shareholders and the managers. 
The board is an instrument in which managers are accountable to the owners, 
the performance of the managers thus being appraised. This so-called “board 
model” combines a monitoring and supervisory function of governing body 
(represented by non-executive directors) with a management function 
(represented by executive directors employed directly by the company). 
Likewise, “boards” of public service bodies – the so-called governing bodies, 
play a similar role to those of the private sector. The difference is that the 
boards in the public sector are chaired by the state or government officials on 
behalf of the wider community. The immediate result is that policy-makers are 
more aware of the contribution good (corporate) governance makes to 
financial market stability, investments and economic growth. 
 
Transferred to the determination of the property rights to public assets, good 
governance principles would, according to Berge (2007: 15) mean the 
following: “If and when governments want to change property rights there are 
some issues that need to be considered. One question that needs to be 
considered carefully is the purpose of ownership. Acting as a trustee, as most 
public ownership is about, requires a different institutional environment than 
ordinary ownership. Another issue is the choice between individual and 
collective ownership. There are good arguments for preferring collective 
ownership if, for example: 
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• resource characteristics and available technology imply that it is 
impossible, difficult or too costly to exclude appropriators; 
• resource interactions imply a necessity for appropriators to 
coordinate activities so that a commons regime will provide a setting 
for solving their collective action problems; 
• the problems of distribution of goods and equity in access to vital 
resources will be easier to solve. The commons may provide a safety 
net for the poor and new generations”. 
 
 
4  On International Experiences in Public Asset 
Management 
 
Not all countries are unaware of the property rights they have to public assets 
and the revenue-generating possibilities that public assets can offer. Among 
transition countries, there are differences regarding the valuation of public 
assets and property rights enforcement (Lízal and Kočenda, 2001; Woodruff, 
2004; Nušinović and Teodorović, 2002). Public asset management practices of 
the countries that have the intention to preserve the national heritage for 
future generations should not be understood as the only means of public asset 
management but they can certainly serve as guidance to countries that are 
striving to achieve better outcomes in the public sector, particularly those 
coming from better public asset usage.  
 
The governments have three possible channels through which to invest their 
excess funds – through monetary authorities (central banks), sovereign 
investment companies and through the SOEs. All these state investment 
vehicles are separate legal entities in state ownership which differ in the 
business goals they are supposed to achieve: 
• The central banks are the most risk-averse and cash-rich investors in 
the world. They try to ensure the back-up funds for keeping the 
domestic currency relatively stable against foreign currencies. The 
central banks’ portfolio consists mainly of government debt, money 
market instruments and gold. Commensurate with the risk taken, 
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their average real return is historically very low, barely reaching 1 
percent annually in the period from 1946-2004 (Kern, 2007). 
• Investment companies invest state-owned assets concentrated into 
funds according to an investment strategy that is very much like that 
of the pension funds. The investment companies invest about 60 
percent of their portfolios in debt securities and the rest in equities 
and other assets, dispersing the risk across various countries and 
currencies. Investment companies can be in major private or state 
ownership, but the assets they manage are always state-owned. 
• SOEs have their own core business activities, but sometimes employ 
an investment strategy that mainly mirrors the state goals rather than 
the goals of their own (M&A activities). The state can have a 100 
percent or majority ownership in these enterprises that mainly 
operate in strategic industries such as oil and gas, defence, banking, 
telecommunications, etc. 
 
Countries rich in public assets of any type (foreign exchange reserves, natural 
resources including mineral deposits, fiscal surplus, state-owned entities, public 
savings, privatisation receipts) usually establish a fund of designated public 
assets and employ either an existing or a new company to manage it. The 
second name for a state-owned fund is an extra-budgetary fund, while their 
managing investment companies are also called extra-budgetary companies. An 
extra-budgetary entity is an entity which uses extra-budgetary accounts and it 
may have its own governance structure. The legal status of an extra-budgetary 
entity is often independent of government ministries and departments (Allen 
and Radev, 2007). Extra-budgetary funds’ transactions refer to general 
government transactions with separate banking and institutional 
arrangements, not included in the budget accounts (Allen and Radev, 2007: 
3).7  However, the concept of extra-budgetary funds is much broader than 
assumed in this paper, including not only the excess public funds, but also 
various social security funds that collect and transfer designated public 
                                                 
7 Similarly, according to the IMF's definition, extra-budgetary funds generally refer to government transactions 
that are not included in the budget totals or documents and typically are not subject to normal budgetary 
execution and control procedures. Such transactions may be financed by foreign aid or by earmarked revenues 
that are not included in the budget (for more details see Potter and Diamond, 1999). 
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revenues to their beneficiaries - citizens. The extra-budgetary funds can be 
divided into various sub-categories of funds, but in this paper we consider 
only the following: 
• Savings funds (non-renewable funds) or funds that invest and store 
current public assets for future generations. These include, for 
example, oil saving funds. Such funds have a long-term investment 
horizon. 
• Stabilisation funds or funds established to reduce the impact of price 
volatility in commodities, which some countries are exposed to, 
either through above-average export or import activities. These funds 
are directed to keep budgetary and fiscal policies consistent and thus 
have to take account of the term structure of assets. 
• Development funds or funds set up to support development 
programmes usually involving internal contributions such as 
privatisation receipts or donor contributions, i.e. transfers from the 
budget. Sometimes they are called special or strategic funds.8  
 
The described categories of extra-budgetary funds are sometimes broadly 
considered as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), provided that they act primarily 
as investment vehicles. The constant increase of assets in the SWFs is granted 
by continuous contributions of assets and the return on (re)invested assets. 
The continual contributions of assets into funds stem from earmarked 
revenues which come mainly from special taxes, foreign exchange reserves, 
budgetary transfers, sale of financial and non-financial assets including 
privatisation receipts, sale of goods, provision of services, and borrowing 
(Blundell-Wignall, Hu, and Yermo, 2008). The prime differences between the 
SWFs and other extra-budgetary funds, SOEs and central banks are depicted in 
Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 All extra-budgetary funds are enumerated and described in Allen and Radev (2007), but precaution must be 
taken as different terms might be employed across various countries. 
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Table 5  Differences between State Investment Vehicles 
Features SWFs SOEs 
Public 
pension plans
Central banks 
Asset 
ownership 
government/ 
state 
primarily 
government/state
pension 
members/state
state 
Primary 
purpose 
depends on 
the goals of 
the state 
depends on the 
type of economic 
activity they deal 
with 
meeting the 
fund assets 
with defined 
benefit 
obligations 
maintenance 
of  national 
currency 
stability and 
liquidity in the 
domestic 
financial 
system 
Funding source 
commodity/ 
non-
commodity 
government/ 
corporate 
earnings 
pension 
contributions 
foreign 
exchange 
reserves 
Government 
control 
very significant significant insignificant insignificant 
Disclosure 
varies, but 
usually poor 
varies varies transparent 
Investment 
horizon 
long long to indefinite long 
usually short 
to medium 
Explicit 
liabilities 
low usually moderate usually high 
vary, but 
typically lower 
than assets 
Investment 
return 
usually 
moderate to 
high 
usually low and 
steady 
low to 
moderate and 
steady 
low and steady 
Possibility to 
create their 
own 
companies 
yes (sovereign 
wealth 
enterprises – 
SWEs) 
yes no no 
 
Source: Adopted and adapted from SWF Institute (2008). 
 
As evident from the data in Table 5, the influence of the state is greater in the 
SWFs and SOEs than in central banks. The control rights of the state arise 
through the appointed members of the board but the degree of control in 
daily operational decisions varies among countries. One of prevailing features 
of the SWFs is that they are established to shield the domestic economy and to 
increase the value-added of domestic assets. Unlike SOEs that are established 
for manufacturing or for providing services, and extra-budgetary funds that 
serve as transfer vehicles from the budget to designated cost-centres, the SWFs, 
though classified as a type of extra-budgetary funds, are primarily investment 
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vehicles.9 Even when the SWFs are funded to fulfil specific goals, they rarely 
have explicit liabilities, and that is the main distinguishing feature between 
SWFs and other extra-budgetary funds such as pension and social security 
funds.  
 
The formation of public pension plans and social security funds is quite 
common throughout continental Europe, while the CEE countries have in 
addition established off-budgetary funds to facilitate the privatisation 
processes. The off-budgetary funds in transition countries have been by and 
large treated as being in economic ownership of the government, meaning that 
the government is allowed to dispose of the assets of the funds by decrees or 
by changes in the law (Kraan, 2004). 
 
Sometimes the role of each group of the state investment vehicles is not clearly 
distinguished, mainly because some of them act as trustees for others. 
Although we limit the discussion to the investment companies and SWFs they 
manage, we do not exclude some of the state-owned funds being directly 
managed by the central bank or the ministry of finance (MoF), as in Norway, 
Singapore (GIC), Russia and Saudi Arabia. 
 
According to Hildebrand (2007), a vice-chairman of the Swiss National Bank, 
the first SWF in the world, was the French Caisse des Dépots et Consignations 
(CDC) - the investment bank for the government and oversees tax-exempt 
savings funds collected by savings banks and the post office, established in 
1816. However, the history of SWFs is broadly considered to have started in 
1953 when the Kuwait Investment Authority was established. The non-
renewable funds were the first SWFs. Most non-renewable funds originate in 
areas abundant in oil reserves (Arabian countries, Norway, Alaska) as well as 
from countries rich in other natural resources such as copper (China, USA, 
the Philippines). Today the non-renewable funds are the largest in the entire 
SWF universe, whereby some SWFs, created on the foundations of export 
revenues from oil exploitation, also belong to the group of stabilisation funds 
(i.e. Russian stabilisation fund). Temporarily there are about 50 SWFs 
                                                 
9 An overview of numerous definitions of sovereign wealth funds is given by Balding (2008). 
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estimated to comprise an aggregate amount of USD 2.5-3 trillion of assets 
(Kern, 2007). The asset size of the majority of funds is difficult to estimate, as 
most governments are not required to disclose information on the fund's 
assets, liabilities, and underlying investment strategy. However, some 
influential research departments and institutions have tried to approximate the 
assets size of major SWFs. A brief overview of world’s major SWFs and their 
investment companies deriving from this research is presented in Table 6.  
 
As shown in Table 6, The Government Pension Fund of Norway is the largest 
SWF in Europe, while the Abu Dhabi based ADIA’s managed fund takes the 
first place worldwide with approximately USD 900 billion worth assets. The 
latter has the largest amount of accumulated assets per citizen of more than 
USD 1.5 million. The asset size of the SWFs is a constant cause of dispute even 
in democratic countries such as Norway, where elections are lost and won due 
to the various political proposals for finding an alternative practical use for 
the fund’s assets rather then (re)investing them (Aslund, 2007).  
 
In China, the investment company in charge of the fund’s asset management 
is China Investment Corporation (CIC). China followed the example of 
Taiwan, Thailand and India (Rozanov, 2005), imitating, just like South Korea, 
Temasek Holdings’ investment principles in acquiring stakes in interesting 
companies. Moreover, China’s SWF is projected to grow by USD 200 billion 
yearly while Russia is lagging behind with USD 40 billion annual increase 
(Whyte and Barysch, 2007). Such projections of a surge in some SWF assets are 
bound to the high oil prices and global macroeconomic instabilities that 
enabled the Russian economy to earn USD 850 million, while Saudi Arabia 
earned more than USD 500 million USD from oil exports a day (Rozanov, 
2005). 
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Table 6 An Overview of Wealthiest State-Owned Funds and their  
            Investment Companies Worldwide 
Country 
Name of the 
investment company 
Name of the 
fund(s) 
Inception 
year 
Estimate
d assets 
-USD bn 
Source of 
funding 
UAE 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA) with 
affiliates 
Portfolio split into 
asset classes 
1976 875 Oil 
Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Finance / 
Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA) 
Foreign holdings N/A 433 Oil 
Singapore 
Government of 
Singapore Investment 
Corporation (GIC) 
Several funds that 
invest in equities, 
real estate and 
special 
investments 
1981 330 
Non-
commodity 
China 
State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) Investment 
Company in Hong Kong 
Fund of equity 
holdings 
1997 311.6 
Non-
commodity 
Norway 
Norges Bank 
Investment 
Management (NBIM) 
Government 
Pension Fund - 
Global (GPFG) 
1990 301 Oil 
Kuwait 
Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA) 
General Reserve 
Fund (GRF), Future 
Generations Fund 
(FGF) 
1953 264.4 
Oil, public 
revenues’ 
surplus 
China 
China Investment Corp 
(CIC), that  includes 
Central Hujin 
Investment Corp. 
Sovereign Wealth 
Fund of China 
2007 200 FX reserves  
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA) 
Investment 
portfolio and 
backing portfolio 
1998 173 
Non- 
commodity 
Russia 
Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) 
National Welfare 
Fund , that invests 
in equities 
emerged after split 
of Stabilisation 
Fund 
2008 189.7 Oil 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 
Portfolio is split 
into various 
investment classes
1974 134 
Non- 
commodity 
UAE – Dubai
Investment Corporation 
of Dubai, a holding 
broken into several 
operating investment 
companies 
Manages sovereign 
wealth enterprises 
(SOEs), domestic 
and foreign equity 
holdings 
2006 82 Oil 
China 
National Council for 
Social Security Fund 
(SSF). 
National Security 
Social Fund 
(NSSF) 
2000 74 
Non- 
commodity 
Qatar 
Qatar Investment 
Authority (QIA) 
State Investment 
Fund 
2003 60 Oil 
Libya 
Lybian Investment 
Authority and external 
managers 
Reserve Fund 2006 50 Oil 
Algeria Bank of Algeria 
Revenue 
Regulation Fund 
2000 47 Oil 
Australia 
The Future Fund 
Management Agency 
Australian Future 
Fund (AGFF) 
2004 43.8 
Non- 
commodity 
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Kazakhstan 
National Bank of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan 
National Fund 
2000 38 Oil 
Brunei 
Brunei Investment 
Agency (BIA) 
Government of 
Brunei's General 
Reserve Fund 
1983 30 Oil 
South Korea
Korea Investment 
Corporation (KIC) 
Foreign Exchange 
Stabilisation Fund 
2005 30 
Non- 
commodity 
USA (Alaska)
Alaska Permanent 
Reserve Fund 
Corperation (APRF) 
Alaska Permanent 
Fund 
1976 29 Oil 
France Caisse des Dépôts 
Strategic 
Investment Fund 
for enhancing 
equity and help 
stabilising French 
firms 
2008 28 
Non- 
commodity 
Malaysia 
Khazanah Nasional 
(KNB), oversees 
government controlled 
companies and invests 
surplus funds 
Government 
Investment Fund 
1993 25.7 
Non- 
commodity 
Ireland 
National Treasury 
Management Agency 
National Pensions 
Reserve Fund 
2001 22.8 
Non- 
commodity 
 
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2008). 
 
The accumulation of assets in the SWFs in the hands of potential geopolitical 
rivals has caused fear in the West, especially regarding takeovers in some 
strategic industries. A nascent issue is whether governments have a legitimate 
right to protect domestic strategic companies, while urging the takeovers of 
their counterparties in less developed countries. In fear of some Arabian funds’ 
investments, the developed countries announced official stances towards SWF 
investments, which are articulated in Table 7. 
 
As shown in Table 7, the validity of the fear factor should be judged according 
to asset size and public accountability. Most analysts share a view that the 
SWFs’ asset size is significant but not huge in comparison to the assets of 
other institutional investors. For example, the combined value of traded 
securities in Africa, the Middle East and emerging Europe was about USD 4 
trillion, which corresponded to all Latin American companies’ capitalisation 
(Johnson, 2007). Before the distortion of asset prices caused by the financial 
crisis, the amounts of assets in the SWFs were estimated to exceed the world 
national foreign exchange reserves held and managed by the central 
banks/state treasuries in 2011, reaching USD 12 trillion by 2015 (Morgan 
Stanley, 2007).  
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Table 7  Developed Countries’ Stance Towards the SWFs’  
             Investment Presence 
Country Views on SWFs’ growth 
United 
States of 
America 
Treasury officials underlined the country’s commitment to an open 
investment climate, welcoming the SWFs in principle. It has been suggested 
that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank provide a set 
of best practice rules for the SWFs. The best practice rules should provide 
guidance and incentives to ensure appropriate institutional arrangements, 
governance, operational and risk management, accountability, as well as the 
transparency of rules, operations, asset management and investment 
performance. 
United 
Kingdom 
The government maintains the UK’s traditional liberal position in attracting 
foreign capital. It has rejected discouraging foreign state investment funds 
from pursuing investments in the country, and the negotiations of common 
rules at the international level. However, the reciprocity in market access is 
considered a vital precondition for the SWFs presence in the long run. 
European 
Union 
The EU has reiterated its commitment to open markets, emphasising that it 
would be disconcerting if the EU countries were not open and attractive to 
SWF investments. However, the Commission acknowledges the potential 
need to protect sensitive industries, especially where buying countries 
protect those domestically. The importance of reciprocal market openness is 
emphasised. Recently the Commission has considered the introduction of a 
regime of European golden shares. 
France 
France already has a stringent legal framework that allows the protection of 
key industries against foreign ownership. Although no concrete policy 
measures have been announced, the current government has indicated that 
it is pursing an industrial policy that considers the national interest. 
Italy 
The Italian government has taken a liberal stance on the SWF presence 
issue and announced its support for liberal market access and indifference 
regarding the nationality of potential investors. The concept of golden shares 
has been met with reserve. 
Germany 
The government has suggested that the G8 develop a set of transparency 
rules for the operation and asset management of the SWFs. With respect to 
the protection of the vital industries, a working group among the Chancellery, 
and the Economics and Finance Ministries has been formed to review SWF 
investment policy options. The German government is considering 
establishing an investment fund of its own, which could serve as a strategic 
investor in selected German companies and protect them against undesired 
foreign investment. In terms of industrial policy, the government is seeking 
coordination at the EU level in order to avoid a patchwork of national rules 
and their potential negative impact on the Internal Market. 
Russia 
Operating a large SWF itself, the Russian government takes a protectionist 
stance on foreign investments. Following recent legislation, the Russian 
national intelligence agency - Federal Security Service (FSB), is actively 
involved in decisions regarding foreign ownership in 39 key industries, such 
as nuclear energy, aerospace, natural resources and the arms industry. 
 
Source: Adopted and adapted from Kern (2007). 
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To check whether the efforts of governments to implement transparency in 
financial reporting for the SWFs are justifiable, we examined if and to what 
extent the state-owned funds’ investment objectives are open to the public, 
both domestically and abroad. Surprisingly, we came across only a couple of 
investment companies that may be called transparent investment vehicles. We 
estimated their transparency according to: existence of separation of ownership 
and management of assets in the funds, investment policy and objectives 
disclosed, and degree of public accountability. This is illustrated in Table 8. 
 
When examining the investment policy of the SWFs we paid much attention 
to the accountability of the investment companies to the ultimate asset owners 
in order to prevent any possible misconduct and malpractice. In our opinion, 
the most transparent investment strategy is that disclosed by Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund Global, followed by the Alaska Permanent Fund 
Corporation (the only investment company that regularly pays dividends to its 
citizens), Singapore’s Temasek Holdings and GIC, whose corporate governance 
premise is that “it does not own the funds it manages, but manages them on 
behalf of its clients”.10 If the Kuwait Investment Authority opened the door to 
the public, it would also belong to that group. According to the data disclosed 
in Table 8, it is evident that the fear factor varies depending on the level of 
transparency shown in external reporting. The greater the financial reporting 
transparency the lower the fear factor in countries that perceive that their 
companies might become the investment targets of the SWFs. This is of no 
wonder since billions of dollars can easily find a prey struggling for capital 
injection. It is a fact that government or state-owned investment companies are 
formed as a tool for conducting government policies ranging from raising 
funds to strategic industry sector restructuring. Consequently, the advisory 
role that some developed countries’ officials take towards those of the 
developing countries has to be estimated in line with the goals of the 
“advisory” governments in question. This is so especially because governments 
are accountable to their own citizens only, not to the entire world, whatever 
their international policy stance might be.  
 
                                                 
10 For more details see – http://www.gic.com.sg/aboutus_check.htm. 
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We understand the common features of all the SWFs as the following: 
• the funds are “owned” either by the government/ministries or by the 
state, on behalf of the citizens; 
• the investment management companies employ professionals from 
the business world, who are independent in their day-to-day activities; 
• disclosure is mostly limited to National Assembly (Parliament) and 
Government, especially for Arab countries’ funds; 
• both internal and external audits are applied. 
 
The questionable transparency of some SWFs’ investments may not only 
provoke a fear of prospect M&A activities internationally, but also a fear of 
possible corruption among the administrative personnel managing the funds 
or even governments themselves. For some small countries such as Kuwait, the 
investment companies that manage the SWFs act not only as public funds’ 
managers, but also as: agents in the privatisation process, trustees for other 
state-owned financial companies, liquidity supporters as well as export and 
investment promotion agencies. As a matter of precaution against corruption, 
we deem the state-owned funds should employ the reporting and disclosure 
standards of investment profession in general. This is because the investment 
policy applied in the SWFs may be influenced by political rather than 
economic factors. 
 
The debate on the international impact of the SWFs has provoked the 
supranational institutions such as the IMF and the OECD to announce the 
development of a voluntary code of conduct for the SWFs. Meanwhile, in 
October 2008 the SWFs themselves developed their own proposal for a 
voluntary code of conduct, known as “Santiago Principles”, which target 
greater transparency of the SWFs with special regard to their connectivity with 
domestic ruling authorities (International Working Group of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, 2008). Until the voluntary code of conduct is generally 
accepted, the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index serves as a general guidance 
of rating the SWFs according to their transparency.11   
                                                 
11 For more information on Linaburg-Maduell index and SWFs rankings see:  
http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/transparencyindex.php. 
 From Accountable Government to Public Asset Management Reform and Welfare 94 
Rather than being concerned with the transparency of the SWFs, we try to 
stress the responsibility of the funds’ managing personnel towards the true 
owners of the assets – the citizens, and then to the participants in the global 
financial market. If the transparency of the state-owned funds is astonishingly 
low even in developed countries, a logical question posed is what developing 
countries can do to preserve their natural and other resources. 
 
 
5  Public Asset Management and its Perspectives 
in Transition Countries 
 
Many transition countries experienced a sudden change in political regimes 
that influenced all structures of their societies. Some of the adverse 
consequences of the change in the political system were stagnant economic 
growth, persistence of the inherited bureaucracy, abolishment of the existing 
legislation and abandonment of the moral acquis. The political elites of 
former times have been transformed into the political elites of the new time, 
offering the people the new ideology of capitalism. But the truth was that even 
political elites, unaware of their incompetence and totally unprepared for 
market economy, got lost in the transition process. The corruption that 
emerged at all levels of the government was an expected consequence of the 
process. People’s adaptation to changes that transition process has brought was 
unfortunately not that fast, confirming that the people’s minds and 
competencies do not change overnight.  
 
Sometimes the damage to society was inflicted deliberately with the aim of 
achieving or maintaining individual welfare (Nellis, 1999) but sometimes the 
damage resulted from ignorance. The inexistence of public officials’ reaction 
to prevent corruptive behaviour has let corruption become an integral part of 
adaptation to a new system. Inefficient judicial systems were more occupied 
with proposals for “new” laws than with determining the clauses on the 
responsibility for the harm done to the society. Instead of being rooted out 
quickly, corruption became a norm of behaviour. Public asset management 
was in no better state than the government administration as a whole in that 
 Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika 117 / 2008. 95 
scene. The lack of cadastral evidence, which was regarded as unnecessary in the 
socialist culture, in which everything was “common”, enabled malversation in 
the trade in newly established property rights. In many transition countries the 
enterprises in “common” or “social” ownership were transformed into the 
state or governmentally owned ones. The subsequent privatisation of many of 
them served as a means of filling the state budgets to decrease huge public 
deficits. Unfortunately, the privatisation receipts were often one-off as many of 
the privatised enterprises were liquidated or went bankrupt thereafter. The 
public officials’ way of thinking was unilateral and short-term, while the 
interests of the well-being of the society were generally disregarded. The usual 
excuse for all the evils that occurred was found in the transition process itself. 
 
In all the fuss of transition, the basic accounting equation, according to which 
public assets equal the sum of public liabilities and public equity, was 
forgotten or misinterpreted. Especially this equation was abused in the case of 
SOEs whose assets were estimated at book-keeping values, which had not been 
changed for many years, even when the enterprises were to be sold. Meanwhile, 
the liabilities were recorded at market values since they were piling up 
continuously. In the shortage of fresh capital available for new investment, the 
asset base gradually decreased due to accounting for depreciation. If the basic 
accounting equation had been rearranged in such a way that “citizen/taxpayer 
equity = public assets – public liabilities”, as suggested by Gauthier (1997), and 
if the values entering the equation had been revalued at least annually, the 
erosion of public assets would probably not have happened to such a great 
extent. As stated by Peterson (1999), though at the municipal level: 
• “The assets (and liabilities) of municipalities in developing and 
transitional countries often are very large compared to their annual 
budget revenues or expenditures. Often, a municipality may have 
only a vague idea of the economic value of some of the most 
important assets it owns or may have no clear conception even of the 
“things” that it owns. Municipalities frequently are startled to find 
the magnitude of cash holdings they possess, once a thorough 
accounting of the cash on hand is taken into account. Local 
governments often have even less awareness of their liabilities.  
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• Municipalities usually have much more freedom of choice over their 
handling of municipal assets and liabilities than they do of 
municipal revenues. While central governments in developing 
countries often impose rigorous limitations on the right of local 
governments to establish their own taxes, set their own tax rates or 
borrow from the credit market, they rarely place any limitations on 
the rights of local governments to own, operate, acquire or dispose of 
discretionary assets not critical to public service delivery.  
• A municipality that reconsiders its appropriate mix of asset 
ownership, in light of its service priorities and its mission, may 
decide to sell off some of the housing stock or municipal enterprises 
that it owns, in order to reinvest the sale proceeds in assets (like the 
public water or wastewater system) that are more critical to its 
mission. It is possible to consider the choice within a budgetary 
framework, but it seems more natural and useful to analyse it as a 
portfolio choice. Decisions about municipal borrowing likewise often 
need to be made in the context of the balance sheet. In countries 
other than the United States, including some countries in Western 
Europe, the equivalent of general obligation borrowing is balance 
sheet borrowing where municipal debt is secured by all of the assets 
owned by a municipality”. 
 
In some small transition countries, all assets were initially recorded as state-
owned assets, whereas the local authorities were occasionally bestowed with 
land or certain enterprises by government decrees, or they were permitted to 
take part in the privatisation process, as in the case of Hungary. As pointed 
out in Kaganova and Nayyar-Stone (2000), public real estate was commonly 
treated as the public good until the 1980s, when public real estate started to be 
considered as public assets producing a mix of both measurable and 
immeasurable returns. Almost at the same time, this approach appeared at the 
local level in some US cities, and as a central government policy in New 
Zealand. As Kaganova and Nayyar-Stone (2000: 310) further state: “The vision 
of public real estate as a productive asset had serious implications for public 
sector accounting. In particular, acknowledgement of the importance of public 
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capital assets for the overall financial health of governments, coupled with the 
idea of making public authorities accountable, resulted in a growing tendency 
to introduce accrual accounting for (central) and local governments”. The 
authors reiterated that the introduction of accrual accounting at the 
government level does not by itself guarantee more efficient public asset 
management, but it is certainly one of preconditions towards greater 
efficiency. 
 
For the purpose of efficient public asset management, the real estate has to be 
divided into: 
• real estate serving central or local government officials, or real estate 
for the “main” business of government; and 
• manageable real estate in state ownership. 
 
Although all government premises with public administration might fit the 
first category, the latter category is much more difficult to determine. 
However, if the IFAC’s definition in determining what assets are public is 
taken into consideration, it becomes evident that all asset categories that can 
find their place in the balance sheet of each enterprise can belong to public 
assets. The decision of finding an appropriate use of public assets depends on 
the following features: 
• constitutionally determined goals of a country; 
• strategic goals of national economy development; 
• public interests in terms of historical, traditional and revenue 
generating possibilities, targeted to better public services providing; 
and  
• public administration competencies. 
 
Strategic economic and development goals in transition economies are rarely 
clearly defined. Some development strategies even served more for the payment 
of foreign consultants than for the finding of an adequate purpose for public 
assets usage and revenue generation streams. Historically, both developed and 
developing countries have protected their vital economic sectors. This is, 
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although to a lesser extent, present even nowadays, when the ideas of free trade 
and internal markets are strongly promoted. 
 
The 20th century witnessed times of extreme state protectionism as well as 
times of entire market liberalisation. Both concepts claimed that ownership 
structure matters for the purpose of achieving higher economic growth. Since 
the break-up of the Eastern Bloc in the 1990s there have been continuing 
pressures on the governments of the CEE and later the SEE countries to 
privatise the companies in state ownership. By allowing takeovers, the 
governments freed the way to foreign direct investments and multinational 
companies’ presence. Once unsuccessful, formerly state-owned, strategic 
companies have frequently turned into the market leaders shortly after the 
takeover. This has provoked a still unresolved issue on whether the privatised 
enterprises could have achieved the same results if the ownership structure had 
not been changed. 
 
Even if current ownership ratios of the states (governments) and the private 
companies (individuals) in the entirety of enterprises are taken for granted, a 
lot of controversial issues emerge. They range from the (un)fair ways 
privatisations have been conducted to their subsequent effects on business 
development and growth, employment, social responsibility, etc. The 
exploitation of domestic resources by foreign companies has recently provoked 
the pull-back of some Latin American countries towards asset nationalisation 
and protectionism. 
 
The ownership transformation processes that have been, depending on the 
given country, going on for almost 20 years, resulted in liberalisation of once 
closed economies. They have left some citizens in prosperity and some in 
poverty. However, a lot of assets remained in state (government or municipal) 
ownership, which entails a peremptory answer as to how their ownership and 
use should ultimately be determined. The task of each government is 
undoubtedly to fight for the interests of its citizens and to ensure them 
prosperity and welfare. The governments have to take account of democratic 
will and liberal market foundations, being aware that their achievements are 
periodically evaluated at democratic elections. The institutional power of the 
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state is a privilege, not a guaranteed right for a pre-determined political elite. It 
has to be used only for public well-being, not for exclusively private interests 
and communal rent appropriation. 
 
In places fighting corruption, the power of the political elite should be limited 
by regulatory framework, discretionary parliamentary decisions, and in case of 
controversies determined by the plebiscitary will. This is especially the case 
when big capital projects, whose realisation commits future generations to 
participation in present public indebtedness, are an issue. No government has 
the right to hamper future generations’ welfare. As Fama and Jensen (1983: 2) 
stated, the central contracts in any organisation specify the nature of residual 
claims and the allocation of the steps of the decision process among agents. 
Governments are nothing else but agents of the citizens, because it would be 
practically impossible if millions of people of different ideas exercised 
management rights. 
 
Several organisational theories can be applied to the management of public 
assets (and liabilities). These are: property rights theory, agency theory and 
transaction cost theory. 
 
The main concerns of property rights theory, initiated by Coase (1960), are 
social welfare, inefficiency impact on overall economy, public policy and legal 
framework. Agency theory concentrates on the economic incentives of 
individuals, particularly on mitigating interests of agents and principals in 
order to maximise aggregate economic payoffs. While the agency theory deals 
with ex-ante design of contracts and providing market incentives, the 
transaction cost theory assumes an incomplete contract setting. An inefficient 
initial allocation of property rights, even if decision makers act rationally, may 
result in fixed bargaining positions that are vastly divergent and hence 
difficult to reconcile. According to Kim and Mahoney (2005: 234), this leads 
to persistent suboptimal contracting outcomes. 
 
Back in the 18th century Thomas Paine stated that the purpose of good 
government was to have general happiness as its only object. “When, instead of 
this it operates to create and increase wretchedness in any of the parts of 
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society, it is on a wrong system and reformation is of necessity” (cited in 
Agassi, 1991: 447). In his pamphlet Agrarian Justice published in 1797, Paine 
argued that the income from the progressive inheritance tax should go into a 
national fund from which allowances that all citizens would be entitled to 
would be paid. That was based on the well-known claim that originally – in the 
“natural state” – all land had been common and not private property, and the 
citizens would only get back that which was theirs by right (Agassi, 1991). The 
theoretical attitude of Paine is followed in Alaska in practice. In other words, 
the purpose of good government is to behave as a good manager and to ensure 
redistribution of national wealth to bring about welfare for all the citizens. 
 
As stated by Heltberg (2001), local resource management research often focuses 
on the efficiency, sustainability and distributional impact of management 
institutions. Hereby efficiency is defined as maximising the discounted profits 
from the resources, while sustainability refers to a rate of harvest that does not 
exceed long-term resource regeneration. In addition, the failure of governments 
as common property managers is explained by government agencies' lack of 
detailed information and the fact that the nature of many resources makes 
central monitoring difficult and costly. On the other hand, economic and 
political inequality and rent-seeking sometimes undermine the effectiveness 
and efficiency of local institutions, which do not always secure equitable and 
fair outcomes (Heltberg, 2001: 197-198). 
 
As public institutions consist of people of various, sometimes questionable, 
competencies, the crucial question is to whom the public agencies are 
responsible for their activities. This leads us to the application of corporate 
governance or good governance principles in public asset management. 
 
Many OECD countries consider the agency model as an appropriate 
alternative to traditional budget organisation, which is applied in order to 
introduce or strengthen mechanisms of control and incentives for public 
sector managers. Although agencies can operate within the budgetary system, 
in many cases they are organised as extra-budgetary funds. This, among other 
things, allows them to retain and use fees and charges to finance their own 
expenditures, rather than transferring these revenues to the budget (Allen and 
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Radev, 2007: 9). The agency model is usually found in developed countries, 
but agencies are set up in developing and transition countries as well. 
However, in developed countries agencies are set up to circumvent often rigid 
state administration and enhance efficiency, while in developing countries 
agencies are formed in addition to existing public institutions, such as 
ministries that are already in charge of the same or similar tasks. The purpose 
of public agencies in developing countries is either to attract the educated 
people in public administration, to mask on increase of the employed in the 
public sector or to mimic the inadequate results of existing public institutions. 
Thus, an agency model is not a recommended practice for developing and 
transition countries that do not have sufficiently strong governance and 
financial management systems to sustain such an approach (Allen and Radev, 
2007: 27). It is especially the case if existing budgetary institutions, whose 
responsibilities are comparable to the responsibilities of the established 
agencies, realise questionable outcomes.  
 
If it is opted that extra-budgetary funds should be established as public 
agencies, accompanied by either administrative mechanisms or market-like 
incentives, then extra-budgetary funds should promote accountability and 
efficiency, which can lead to microeconomic efficiency gains by stimulating 
private market conditions where levels and standards of service are linked 
directly to fees and charges (Allen and Radev, 2007: 13). In addition, Allen and 
Radev (2007: 14) define a public agency as a body that: 
• operates with some degree of autonomy from political direction; 
• is established in a founding law, charter or conduct; 
• manages its budget autonomously, but with a framework of rules set 
by the government; 
• is financed through a combination of own source revenues, 
earmarked contributions and transfers from the state budget; 
• has assets that are owned by the public and may not be used for 
private benefit; 
• is accountable to the public, as defined by law and tradition. 
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Therefore, new agency establishment in transition countries is considered as 
justifiable when special tasks of public interests cannot be achieved by existing 
institutions and mechanisms. Moreover, it is irrelevant whether the agencies 
are publicly or privately owned as long as they serve the interests of citizens 
and as long as their accountability is clearly defined. The most profound 
examples are the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in the United 
States of America. Yet, owning the GSEs’ shares does not mean owning the 
funds they manage. There again these GSEs publicly offer only bonds backed 
by mortgages. There is no word about ownership, but about making the 
housing policy and ensuring liquidity in the financial system, which both are 
public goals. It is also in line with the benefit principle, originating from the 
17th century, which states that people should pay taxes according to the 
benefits they receive from government programmes. 
 
There are often misunderstandings about classifying the agencies that manage 
public assets and funds they manage. These misunderstandings refer not only 
to a double financial reporting system - one for an agency and the other for a 
fund managed, but also to the public listing. If government or state-owned 
agencies are regarded as centres of excellence that conduct the state’s policy, 
their equity shares can partly be listed in the official financial market. The 
same holds if the agencies are financed by collecting the funds from debt issue 
(bonds, notes, commercial papers). But if the funds they manage are denoted 
as the ones that belong to the public, it is a wrong perception to list them in 
the public market as it was the case with some privatisation funds. 
 
The recommendations for proper extra-budgetary funds’ functioning are given 
by the IMF (1999), Davis et al. (2001) and other authors. Some of these 
recommendations are as follows: 
• the fund should be totally dedicated to its task and not be founded as 
a means of avoiding budgetary discipline; 
• the fund should be constituted as an agency and operate principally 
as a purchaser, not a provider of services; 
• the fund has to have a mission statement, clearly documented goals 
and objectives, physical and financial output indicators; 
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• the fund has to have a system of internal and external controls; 
• a management board with a significant private sector presence, but 
genuinely free of producer interest, should be established and should 
operate with independence, objectivity and impartiality; 
• the activities of funds should be coordinated with those of the rest of 
the public sector; 
• the fund has to have a mechanism that insures full transparency and 
accountability; 
• funds should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and meet 
acceptable standards of accounting and reporting, internal control, 
internal and external audit; 
• the requirements for establishing and operating extra-budgetary funds 
need to be supported by a sound regulatory framework to prevent 
illegal activities; 
• revenue collection function of the fund can be organised in two 
fundamental ways: either integrated within the tax collection system – 
national or local – with funds earmarked for the special purpose, or 
run as a parallel system by the fund itself; 
• ideally, extra-budgetary funds should be covered by all central public 
financial management systems used to manage the general budget: 
cash planning and management, commitment controls, treasury 
single account, accounting, reporting, internal control, audit and 
external oversight. 
 
In addition, political intervention in extra-budgetary fund/SWF transactions is 
treated as a last-resort option. It should be applied only when national security 
is under threat. Confronting goals of whether to preserve assets for future 
generations or to use them for achieving current goals should also be subject 
of parliamentary or even plebiscitary scrutiny for very valuable public assets. 
 
Because most developing countries are characterised by a wealthy elite, a small 
middle class, and a majority composed of the poor, a cautious approach has to 
be applied in public asset management. Earlier protectionist policies were 
designed to protect natural resources from foreign appropriation, whereas 
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nowadays it is a matter of fact that, in the situation of scarce resources, 
appropriation concerns may stem from domestic as well as from foreign 
people/companies/ organisations. 
 
Public assets have to be divided into categories of physical assets (long-term 
and current) and financial assets. Public assets need to be carefully separated 
into the assets for public purposes, assets for purposes of renting (lease) and 
assets for purposes of (partial) sale, i.e. into non-productive and productive 
assets. When deciding on productive assets, close attention should be paid to 
defining whether the assets are of strategic importance or not. Public assets 
need to be concentrated in the public asset funds according to the stated 
criteria. When pooled into these public funds (extra-budgetary funds), asset 
managing has to be delegated to asset managers. Notwithstanding whether the 
managers come from public or private sector, the only criteria applied in their 
choice should be their professionalism and the ultimate accountability 
(fiduciary duty) to the citizens. As it has been said, natural resources, oil 
wealth and other public property should be of benefit to their origin 
countries, and thus to their citizens. The fact that public assets are often not to 
the benefit of citizens is due to the failure of government, which is connected 
with failure of democracy and public accountability (Palley, 2003: 4). After all, 
as Allen and Radev (2007: 9-10) state, “extra-budgetary funds are established to 
smooth budget system failures, ranging from mismatch of time horizons, 
interference of special interests with the budgetary process, inadequate 
mechanisms for allocating resources, failure to recognise the local 
communities’ needs in allocating resources, ineffective control and incentive 
mechanisms for public sector managers, unsatisfactory governance 
arrangements for accountability and transparency and ineffective mechanisms 
for addressing donors’ fiduciary requirements.” 
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6  Conclusion 
 
Good management practice in both private and public sector is well described 
in the existing literature. There is no doubt that many of the recent public 
sector reform mainstreams have firstly been developed and implemented in the 
private sector context (accrual accounting, corporate governance) and then 
translated into the public sector (financial reporting and budgeting, good 
governance). The concept of transparency is imperative for a professional and 
accountable approach in public expenditures planning and in measuring 
public expenditure effectiveness, particularly when performing and controlling 
public asset management activities.  
 
This paper focuses on the worldwide trend towards the establishment of public 
asset management based on the concept of good governance and 
accountability. Public asset management is examined within the broader 
context of public sector management reforms that are aimed at the 
transformation of administrative and government functions in a way similar 
to that employed in the private sector. Governments are accountable for 
providing the best possible service to their citizens, and they should be guided 
by that idea when managing public assets as well. The allocation of public 
money and the quality of public services is strikingly important to taxpayers 
and citizens as ultimate shareholders of public assets, because the allocation of 
public assets most often means allocating welfare among the citizens. 
 
The first precondition for employing public assets for generating public 
revenues is to determine what types of assets constitute the public asset 
portfolio and clearly to determine what components of property rights can be 
enforced on public assets. It also means that ultimate ownership rights should 
be separated from control rights.  
 
To keep control over public spending and influence their own well-being, the 
citizens require good governance procedures to be applied in public asset usage 
activities. The good governance concept includes good management and 
stewardship of public money, and public engagement targeted to achieving 
good outcomes and citizens’ welfare. In other words, public sector 
management in general government has to balance between public interest and 
the fulfilment of government roles, while being constantly accountable to the 
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ultimate shareholders of public assets. As Duruigbo (2006: 37) noticed, 
“contending that the resources belong to the people is one thing, ensuring that 
governments act as faithful trustees and competent managers of those 
resources, is an entirely different – and much more difficult – matter”.  
 
Some governments in developed countries have solved the dilemma of 
employing public assets in order to ensure welfare to their taxpayers and the 
citizenry as a whole (for example, Norway and Alaska). Other countries are 
guided with the idea of preserving national wealth for future generations 
although their accountability to the public is sometimes regarded as very 
questionable, as in the case of most investment companies that manage 
sovereign wealth funds. Although there are objections concerning the  
doubtful transparency of the investment companies that manage the SWFs, 
some developed countries’ advances can be regarded as a crucial change in 
public asset management practices, because the (re)investment of public assets 
preserves the national wealth for future generations. Regardless of the progress 
in public assets growth, the ownership structure or the name the investment 
companies that manage public assets are given, public assets are pooled into 
funds according to the similarity in nature and revenue generating 
possibilities. Such sovereign wealth funds are managed by professionals. Public 
assets are carefully valued and their disposal is estimated according to the 
functions they have in providing public services. According to the NPM, no 
single person or political elite has a right to dispose freely of public assets. 
 
Developing countries, especially transition countries, have faced obstacles in 
public sector functioning. They have not yet achieved a satisfying level of 
efficiency in public sector management in general and in public asset 
management in particular. Regardless of whether transition countries have 
completed privatisation processes or not, a huge set of assets remains publicly 
owned, and they have to be managed properly. The reform processes in the 
public sector urge the definition of the use of public assets and measurement 
of the outcomes. If the experiences of developed countries are to be followed, 
we support the introduction and improvement of modern public asset 
management, which should be guided by market efficiency principles, good 
governance and business-style financial reporting in general governments. The 
professional public asset management should be independent in day-to-day 
operational decisions, but for assets of huge value a parliamentary approval 
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would sometimes be necessary. Public asset management should be conducted 
in line with the development goals and should be used to achieve welfare  for 
all the citizens in a country. Such a scenario may seem improbable for 
implementation in transition countries. However, in the course of public 
sector development something needs to be done regarding unresolved issues 
concerning public assets, in addition to purely concentrating on privatisation, 
which is often regarded as the only mean of public asset management. The 
crucial questions posed are: 
• Should the public wealth remain in the hands of the public 
administration in belief that it is fully aware of the requirement for 
public money to be so allocated as to fulfil public needs? 
• Should national wealth be left to market mechanisms?, or 
• Should transition countries take steps towards sophisticated public 
asset management? 
 
We strongly encourage the last option, being certain that the time has come 
for transition countries practically to implement the postulates of modern 
welfare-state countries that have been struggling to bring about the well-being 
of all their citizens. As Landsberg (2004: 1) emphasised “...in a competitive 
business environment, with shrinking support from both government 
contracts and private donors, and with society’s increasing need for its services, 
the non-profit must embrace the best practices of the commercial, for-profit 
world in order to survive”. 
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